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While peasants worldwide have united in social movements to fight land grabbing 
and protect their right to an adequate standard of living, including their right to 
food and right to land, the post-Soviet rural population, such as in Ukraine, has so 
far not expressed outright resistance to large-scale agricultural development, and 
the peasants’ rights discourse has been absent. 
This article examines Ukrainian peasants’ responses to land grabs and agribusiness 
expansion. It discusses the post-Soviet context, forms of incorporation of the rural 
population in land deals, the lack of rural protests and mobilization, and the prospects 
for small-scale agriculture in the country. 
LAND GRABBING AND THE ABSENCE OF PEASANT RESISTANCE
The World Bank recently included Ukraine in the list of resource-rich and finance-
poor countries that have become targets for land grabbing. The country possesses 
more than 25% of the world’s richest and most fertile soil, ‘Black Earth’, and was the 
Soviet Union’s ‘breadbasket’. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine 
undertook a land reform to break down the collective farms and distribute their lands 
to rural dwellers to help develop private farming. However, since all the other impor-
tant factors (such as capital, know-how, upstream and downstream markets, and the 
rule of law) disappeared with the breakdown of the collectives, rural dwellers could 
not effectively use their land. Instead, land became concentrated: first in the hands of 
rural elites and later accumulated by large domestic and foreign investors that were 
motivated by the upswing in world food markets and the global land rush of the early 
2000s. To date 60% of Ukrainian farmland is controlled by large agribusinesses, whose 
size and scale are comparable with the largest latifundia3 in Brazil and Argentina.4 The 
sale of agricultural land is prohibited in Ukraine until January 2016.5 Agribusinesses, 
therefore, rent land from the rural population (usually at unfavorable rates for the 
latter) or resort to illegal schemes to acquire land. 
This expansion of land grabbing and agribusiness did not face outright resist-
ance from the rural population. Instead, many rural Ukrainians rent out the distributed 
land to agribusinesses, while they cultivate tiny household plots (on average 0.4 hec-
tares). Rural households only use 12% of Ukrainian farmland in total, but contribute 
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to 52.7% of the gross domestic agricultural output. They produce 98% of the total 
harvest of potatoes, 86% of vegetables, 85% of fruits, and 81% of milk.6 The Ukrainian 
government largely overlooks the importance of population farming in its agricultural 
policy and instead supports agribusinesses. In 2012, 60% of all State subsidies to agri-
culture went to large businesses.7 Meanwhile, the rural population is on the brink of 
poverty with 44% having incomes below the subsistence minimum and 7% experiencing 
malnutrition.8
The lack of open protest among the post-Soviet population is often explained 
by 70 years of socialism, during which expressions of disagreement with governmen-
tal actions were prosecuted, and serious protest led to being deported to work in the 
Gulag labor camp. The Ukrainian countryside is also currently experiencing an exodus 
of young and active residents who migrate to urban areas leaving behind the older 
population. Just over 24% of rural Ukrainians are over 60. Nevertheless, while these 
are important factors, our analysis suggests that the main reasons for this ‘quietness’ 
are: (1) the continuity of a dual agrarian structure, and the absence of conditions for 
commercial family farming; (2) the partial inclusion of rural households in land deals 
and large-scale agricultural development; and (3) the adaptability of peasant farming 
allowing it to persist in a hostile environment. 
PEASANTS AND LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
The bifurcated ‘Soviet-like’ agrarian structure remained in Ukraine despite the post-
socialist land distribution: former collectives have been gradually transformed into 
large agribusinesses, while rural dwellers continue subsistence farming with their 
household plots, albeit with fewer opportunities for wage-work. Land grabbing was 
carried out without the physical displacement of the rural population. 
When the large companies arrived in the Ukrainian countryside in the 2000s, 
rural socio-economic conditions were deplorable. The de-collectivization process of 
the 1990s caused: (1) a 40% rate of rural unemployment; (2) the disappearance of formal 
and informal support to households (previously, households were allowed to use 
collec tive facilities, such as pastures, machinery, and input; and pilfering from collec-
tive fields was socially accepted); and (3) a deterioration in rural infrastructure, which 
was formally part of the collectives’ responsibilities. 
The domestic and foreign agribusinesses revitalized large-scale agricultural 
production, converting Ukraine into one of the world’s leading agro-food exporters. 
The new agricultural operators not only took over the land, but also several social 
functions of the former collectives. Some functions are performed in order to prevent 
sabotage to agribusinesses’ fields. Other functions are required by Ukrainian land law, 
which does not allow companies to own agricultural land. Since agribusinesses have 
to rent the land from peasants, they partly incorporate the rural population into large-
scale agricultural development. The rental agreements imply a small (in-kind) payment 
to the landowners with almost no termination or renegotiation options. However, 
these payments are an important additional income for many rural households. 
The lack of small-scale farm development programs, widespread corruption, 
and power discrepancies discourage peasants from using the distributed land for 
commercial farming. Moreover, due to the socialist tradition of industrial farming, 
many rural Ukrainians regard themselves primarily as workers rather than land-
owners, and believe that the agricultural land should be cultivated collectively. 
These factors define the peasants’ preference for wage-jobs at agribusinesses rather 
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than establishing independent family farms. According to the FAO Farm Survey of 
2005, 96% of Ukrainian villagers did not want to start individual farming; 20% of 
those surveyed had a job; and 26% desired an agricultural wage-job.9 Rural workers also 
benefit from additional services provided by their employers (e.g. discounted farm 
input and output, assistance with ploughing, etc.). Rural families with at least one 
member employed at agribusinesses have the lowest poverty risk.
However, not everyone is integrated into large-scale agricultural development. 
Rural unemployment remains high. In 2004, 10% of the working-age rural population 
was unemployed.10 A number of rural households also do not receive rent payments. 
These include those who did not receive land plots during the land distribution, i.e. 
rural teachers, medical staff, postal workers, and those who sold their land in the early 
1990s. Furthermore, a small group of commercial family farmers have experienced severe 
difficulties from the large agribusiness expansion. Large agribusinesses control food 
markets, the value chain and farmland distribution, and also receive the majority of 
State subsidies. This leaves limited opportunities for family farmers to grow and succeed.
ADAPTATION AND PERSISTENCE OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS
The adaptability of rural households is the other factor explaining the lack of rural 
protests against land grabs and large-scale agricultural development. Peasants are able 
to adapt their agricultural production to ensure that it does not overlap with the interests 
of agribusiness. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, rural household production has 
more than doubled. Before peasants produced almost everything for their subsistence 
needs, including wheat and other crops. Nevertheless, with the agribusiness expansion, 
peasants had to change their production strategy. The agribusinesses are interested in 
export-oriented monocrop (primarily wheat, barley and maize) production and neglect 
labor and time-intensive and less profitable agriculture such as potatoes, vegetables, 
fruits, meat, and dairy. Peasants took over this market niche and intensified the pro-
duction of related foods. Today rural households meet their families’ needs with these 
products and sell the surplus on domestic markets. This market segmentation 
contributes to a fragile coexistence of large-scale agriculture with peasant farming. 
However, if the interests of peasants and agribusinesses collide, the latter resort 
to predator politics to eliminate their competitors. The current State program supporting 
the industrialization of milk and meat production attracted agribusiness to this sector 
at the expense of rural households. Rural households are unable to meet the recently 
introduced sanitary requirements for keeping and slaughtering animals, and the annual 
epidemics of swine flu have led to a mass slaughtering of pigs. Peasants see these moves 
as a war against them. 
Furthermore, the system of organized peasant food markets is underdeveloped 
in Ukraine. The majority of potatoes, fruits and vegetables produced by peasants are 
sold at improvised markets or on the roadside. Dairy and meat products require 
certification and can only be sold at official market places that are inaccessible and 
unaffordable to many peasants, or must be collected by intermediaries or processing 
plants. The collectors’ procurement prices are very low, often below peasants’ pro-
duction costs. The absence of efficient protection mechanisms for small-scale farmers 
and a highly monopolized and criminalized collection business (especially for milk) 
means that peasants are unable to bargain for a higher price. In 2012, many peasants 
decided to take action and protested against the low milk procurement prices in front 
of local administration offices in several Ukrainian regions. Nevertheless, protesters 
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did not manage to change the situation. In fact, several participants experienced 
threats, militia control checks, and even legal prosecution as a result of their protest. 
Subsequently, people believed there was a ‘milk mafia’ and State-agribusiness collusion. 
Despite the predatory politics of large agribusiness and the State policy to 
‘modernize’ agriculture in an agro-industrial way, peasant households persist and 
show a phenomenal ability to survive in hard times. While the economic crisis of 
2007–2008, and the ongoing civil war that started in 2014, caused severe financial 
difficulties for many agribusinesses, peasants diversified their activities and became 
almost self-sufficient. The persistence of the peasant mode of production is defined by 
the use of family labor, self-controlled resources, informal networks for food distri-
bution, and traditional forms of land cultivation, which do not require significant input 
or advanced machinery. Peasants produce their food manually and use primarily 
organic fertilizers. Moreover, social relations and mutual support play an important 
role in food sharing and distribution practices.
Academics and practitioners often discuss the sustainable small-scale food 
production in other countries as an alternative to the corporate food regime. These 
discourses are, however, absent in the post-Soviet countryside.11 The Ukrainian rural 
population considers their farming not as an alternative, but rather as subsidiary to 
industrial farming. Rural civil society organizations that could generate ideas about 
peasant rights and sovereignty are scarce, and lack support from the rural population.12
There are ongoing academic and political debates about whether the post-Soviet 
bifurcated agrarian structure will remain stable or transform into a monopolistic agri-
cultural model.13 Until land sales are allowed, large agribusinesses will continue 
operating on peasant land. However, the liberalization of the land market is expected 
within the program of European Union (EU) integration. In this process, both Europe 
and the Ukrainian government should protect the small-scale producers and recognize 
their important contribution to the availability of a more diverse range of nutritious 
products on the market. This would protect both the rights of producers and consumers.
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The introduction of the land market is once again at the top of the political agenda 
in Ukraine. To date, the moratorium—valid until January 2016—prohibits the sale 
and purchase of agricultural land. Yet the current government is already preparing the 
opening-up of the land market with the support of the EU, as highlighted in the 
article above. Since the privatization of farmland is an unpopular topic among the 
(rural) Ukrainian population, liberalization has already been postponed several 
times.15 
According to an opinion poll carried out by the Razumkov Centre in 2011, 
there is no clear majority in favor of private ownership of farmland. While 37.8% 
of the interviewees supported the idea, 34.4% opposed it and 27.9% were unable 
to answer. Major reasons for this opposition were that “land should stay in state or 
municipal ownership” and that “land will be bought up by oligarchs and MPs”.16 This fear 
is shared by State Architectural and Construction Inspection Chief, Maksim Martynyuk, 
who depicts the social consequences as “catastrophic”, and expects farmers to lose 
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their livelihoods if the moratorium is lifted at the beginning of 2016.17 To prevent this, 
and as a result of an assessment for monitoring the implementation of the Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, it 
has been suggested that the moratorium be lifted “in a phased manner”.18 The intro-
duction of a computerized land administration system aims to contribute to greater 
transparency and to lower the costs of land registration.19 However, due to the eco-
nomic crisis and now the civil war in the country, the majority of Ukrainians have no 
money to purchase the relatively cheap land. 
Although the elite governing the country tries to benefit as much as they can 
from Ukraine’s ‘Black Earth’, this important national resource has not yet been official-
ly divided amongst oligarchs and international investors. In the past, there were pro-
tests against the attempts of president Viktor Yanukovych and his ‘family’ to secure 
this future business. It is now the turn of the current President, Petro Poroshenko, 
to feather his own nest within the agricultural sector. Poroshenko, also known as the 
‘chocolate king’ is yet to sell his business, despite having promised to do so once elected 
as president. The acreage of his agro-holding, Agroprodinvest, tripled last year, and 
provides the sugar beet for his famous chocolate company Roshen.20 It is thus no 
coincidence that the agrarian committee is the most popular committee in the Ukrainian 
parliament, and new oligarchs are highly likely to emerge in the agricultural sector.21 
With the Government’s ‘Western turn’ there is a revival of the discourse on 
creating transparency, incentives for foreign direct investment and ensuring prop-
erty rights for the agricultural sector. For instance, in 2014 a new initiative was 
launched with the EU Twinning program to provide examples of EU ‘best practices’ 
in order to support the liberalization of the land market.22 However, this ‘Western 
turn’ does not necessarily lead to a more democratic way of farming and governing 
resources. Instead it could open up the country for Western agribusiness investors 
from the EU and the US.23 This move from a national to a more Western capital-
guided strategy had already been seen after the Orange Revolution in 2004.24 
The lack of support for small-scale producers by international financial insti-
tutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
strongly indicates that national and international agribusinesses are favored in the 
country. The EBRD openly admits that, due to their system of loaning foreign 
currencies, financing small-scale producers is hardly possible.25 The EU Association 
Agreement also assists agribusiness to target Ukraine as a resource-rich country.26 
The liberalization of the land market would be contrary to Article 48 of 
Ukraine’s Constitution, which stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard 
of living sufficient for himself or herself, and his or her family that includes adequate 
nutrition, clothing and housing.”27 These current developments undermine the right 
to adequate food and nutrition. Therefore, while the relationship between the national 
and international elite is changing, unless there are major modifications to the current 
power structures, land concentration will continue28—to the detriment of the 
Ukrainian population.
17 Kuchar, Michail. “Maksim Martynyuk:  
Gosgeokadastr Dolzhen Zanimatsya 
Uchetom Zemel a Ne Ich Raspredeleniem.” 
ZN.UA, April 10, 2015. Available at:  
gazeta.zn.ua/macrolevel/maksim-martynyuk-
gosgeokadastr-dolzhen-zanimatsya-uchetom-
zemel-a-ne-ih-raspredeleniem-_.html. 
18 Tonchovska, Rumyana and David Egiashvili. 
“Using Existing Land Governance Assessment 
Tools for Monitoring Voluntary Guidelines 
Implementation at the National Level.” 
Paper presented at the 2014 World Bank 
Conference on Land and Poverty, Washington 
DC, March 24–27, 2014. Available at:  
www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nr/
land_tenure/TONCHOVSKA_808.pdf.  
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security is available at:  
www.fao.org/docrep/016/i2801e/i2801e.pdf.
19 Rumyana Tonchovska et al., “Standards 
for Land Tenure and Administration.” 
Geospatial World—The Geospatial Industry 
Magazine 9:4 (2014): 37–39. Available at: 
geospatialworld.net/Magazine/MArticleView.
aspx?aid=30950.
20 Samaeva, Yuliya. “Navstrechu Agrokolonial-
izmu.” ZN.UA, April 24, 2015. Available at: 
gazeta.zn.ua/macrolevel/navstrechu- 
agrokolonializmu-_.html. 
21 Leshchenko, Sergii. “Ukraine Between Corrup-
tion and Reform.” Lecture at the Institute for 
Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna, May 7, 2015. 
 Available at: www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
fcr1SMLEWyY.
22 EUUKRAINECOOP. “EU Helps Create 
Ukrainian Agricultural Lands Market.”  
EU Co-Operation News—Newsletter of the 
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, 
September 9, 2014. Available at:  
euukrainecoop.com/2014/09/12/agriculture/. 
23 Word, Jettie, Alice Martin-Prével and Frédéric 
Mousseau. Walking on the West Side:  
The World Bank and the IMF in the Ukraine 
Conflict. Oakland: Oakland Institute, 2014. 
Available at: www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/
oaklandinstitute.org/files/OurBiz_Brief_
Ukraine.pdf. 
24 Plank, Christina. “Ukraine: Die Politische 
Ökonomie der Oligarchen.” Z. Zeitschrift 
Marxistische Erneuerung 99 (2014): 44–52.
25 EUUKRAINECOOP. “EBRD Official:  
‘We Invest €1 billion to Ukraine Every 
Year’.” EU Co-Operation News—Newsletter  
of the Delegation of the European Union to 
Ukraine, January 29, 2015. Available at: 
euukrainecoop.com/2015/01/29/ebrd/.
26 Becker, Joachim. “Untergeordnete Integration: 
Das Assoziationsabkommen zwischen der 
EU und der Ukraine.” Kurswechsel 3 (2014): 
76–82. See also: Euromemorandum. What 
future for the European Union— Stagnation 
and polarisation or new foundations? 2015. 
Available at:  
www2.euromemorandum.eu/uploads/ 
euromemorandum_2015.pdf. 
27 Constitution of Ukraine, 1996, article 48.  
Available at: www.kmu.gov.ua/document/ 
110977042/Constitution_eng.doc.
28 Latifundist. Top 100 latifundistov Ukrainy. 
2015. Available in Ukrainian at:  
latifundist.com/rating/top100#88. 
